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Faculty & Research

Center for Health Care

Management and Policy

2016 Health Care

Forecast Conference

February 18-19, 2016

Arnold and Mabel Beckman Center

100 Academy Drive

Irvine, CA

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Research Colloquia



The Research Colloquium provides a forum for interaction among faculty, students, and visitors interested in the applications of business and management. The colloquium includes presentations by faculty from UC Irvine and other universities, as well as research institutes.

Colloquia Events are open to the public unless otherwise noted; please see event description for more details. 

characterize when this competitive effect leads the seller to prefer to sell the assets together rather than individually.


2016 Events


(Host: Professor Connie Pechmann)


Monday, March 14, 2016


Lessons Learned From Hybrid [In-Person & Online] Teaching


SPEAKER: Lecturer Raymond Pirouz

UNIVERSITY: University of California, Irvine

TIME: 12:00 pm - 1:00 pm

LOCATION: SB1 2100, Experian Case Study Classrooms



Over a six-year period, Raymond Pirouz has taken his “Marketing on the Internet” MBA elective from a standard 10-week in-person course to a hybrid offering wherein the class meets in-person for the first and final session with all other class sessions held completely online. Through trial and error, Raymond has adopted a unique mix of technologies and approaches resulting in key learnings & best practices centered around the pursuit of one central objective: To replicate a “University of” teaching & learning experience in a digital context.




(Host: Professor Alladi Venkatesh)


Friday, March 4, 2016


From Electronic Health Records to Mindful Cyborgs: How Expectations Shape Markets


SPEAKER: Professor Susi Geiger


TIME: 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm




This paper draws its conceptual lens from the sociology of expectations and from market studies to investigate the relationship between hype cycles and how future markets are formed. Through discourse analysis we interrogate a body of 462 publicly accessible texts from the period 2005 to 2015 around digital health technologies and markets across newspapers, internet sources and public policy documents, tracing: the content of the discourse, the promises made and warnings sounded, who contributes to the hype, and its effects on the shaping of the digital healthcare landscape. We find that the digital health technology hype follows an hourglass pattern, where the early market impetus around cost savings in healthcare systems finds itself replaced by a technology development frenzy in a second phase before settling down into a more mature third phase where technologies are integrated into a wider socio-economic discourse again.


The paper contributes to technology marketers' understanding of how technology markets are shaped and how they can position themselves in these markets to best effect, and to marketing researchers' understanding of how complex markets form. We warn against following the 'hype', especially when it encourages companies to engage in technology development that is blinded by the promises of an untapped market and unhinged from broader systems, societal, ethical or economic concerns.




(Host: Professor Chong Huang)


Friday, February 26, 2016

Spillovers Inside Conglomerates: Incentives and Capital


SPEAKER: Professor Denis Sosyura

UNIVERSITY: University of Michigan

TIME: 1:30 pm - 2:45 pm




Using hand-collected data on divisional managers at conglomerates, we find that a change in industry pay in one division generates spillovers on managerial pay in other divisions of the same firm. These spillovers arise only within the boundaries of a conglomerate. The intra-firm spillovers increase when conglomerates have excess cash and when managers have more influence over its distribution, but decline in the presence of strong governance. These spillovers are associated with weaker performance and lower firm value. Our evidence is consistent with simultaneous cross-subsidization via managerial payoffs and capital budgets and suggests that these practices arise in similar firms.


(Host: Professor Luyi Gui)

Friday, February 12, 2016

The Local Realities of Risk, Responsibility, and Regulatory Empowerment: A Frontline Safety Approach

SPEAKER: Assistant Professor Garry Gray

UNIVERSITY: University of Victoria 

TIME: 10:00 am - 11:30 am

LOCATION: SB1 5200, Lyman Porter Colloquia Room & Executive Terrace 



In what ways do social interactions within work settings influence compliance with legal regulations? How do those on the frontline who perform day-to-day work, interpret and respond to regulations designed to specify and bound their work practices? A frontline safety approach takes seriously the relationships between people at the local level, between people and the systems/institutions in which they are embedded, and between people and their wider social and political contexts. It is vital for regulatory scholarship to recognize these issues, in particular, how conceptions of individuals (as rational, responsible, economic actors) are constructed and maintained at these levels. In this presentation, I will illustrate limitations in regulatory empowerment approaches that require citizens to speak up by drawing on field research among blue collar workers in factories and truck driving as well as professionals in white collar settings such as hospitals and universities. Power imbalances play a crucial role in the decision to speak up, however, not only among those doing manual labor, but also among highly trained professionals.




(Host: Professor Ben Lourie)


Friday, February 12, 2016


"Do managers tacitly collude to withhold industry-wide bad news?"


SPEAKER: Professor Catherine M. Schrand

UNIVERSITY: University of Pennsylvania

TIME: 3:00 pm - 4:30 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5200 5th Floor, Lyman Porter Colloquia Room & Executive Terrace



We analyze when firms in an industry could collectively withhold adverse news about industry conditions. Intra-industry correlation in signals should increase capital market pressures to disclose, making it difficult for firms to collectively withhold adverse news.  Using a strategic game framework, we predict that a cooperative withholding equilibrium is possible, but whether it is achievable depends on the structure of the industry, the nature of the industry news, and the extent to which these factors are common knowledge.  Using opacity in 10-Ks as a proxy for withholding, we document a small number of cases of increased intra-industry withholding of adverse news, controlling for changes in firm fundamentals including complexity.  Strategic withholding is more likely in industries with greater negative tailrisk, greater equity incentives, and trade associations that foster interpersonal connections.  The analysis has implications for mandated disclosure of industry-wide news by providing an understanding when economic forces are sufficient to generate voluntary disclosure of industry-wide adverse conditions.





(Host: Professor Rajeev Tyagi)


Friday, February 12, 2016

Robust Dynamic Estimation


SPEAKER: Professor Prasad Naik

UNIVERSITY: University of California, Davis

TIME: 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5100, Corporate Partners Executive Boardroom



Managing marketing resources over time requires dynamic model estimation, which necessitates specifying some parametric or nonparametric probability distribution. When the data generating process differs from the assumed distribution, the resulting model is misspecified. To hedge against such a misspecification risk, the extant theory recommends using White’s (1980) sandwich estimator. This approach, however, only corrects the variance of estimated parameters, but not their values. Consequently, the sandwich estimator does not affect any managerial outcomes such as marketing budgeting and allocation decisions. To overcome this drawback, we present the minimax framework that does not necessitate any distributional assumptions to estimate dynamic models. Applying minimax control theory, we derive an optimal robust filter, illustrate its application to a unique advertising data set from the Canadian Blood Services, and contribute several novel findings. We discover the compensatory effect: advertising effectiveness increases and the carryover effect decreases as robustness increases. We also find that the robust filter uniformly outperforms the Kalman filter on the out-of-sample predictions. Furthermore, we uncover the existence of a profit-volatility tradeoff, similar to the returns-risk tradeoff in finance, whereby the volatility of profit stream decreases at the expense of reduced total profit as robustness increases. Finally we prove that, unlike for-profit companies, managers of non-profit organizations should optimally allocate budgets opposite of the advertising-to-sales ratio heuristic; that is, advertise more (less) when sales are low (high).





(Host: Professor Shuya Yin)


Friday February 5, 2016

Improving Environmental, Health, and Safety in Supply Chains: Some Preliminary Studies


SPEAKER: Professor Chris Tang

UNIVERSITY: University of California, Los Angeles

TIME: 9:30 am - 11:00 am

LOCATION: SB1 5200, Lyman Porter Colloquium Room and Executive Terrace



Many factories in developing countries have serious Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) issues.  Due to inconsistent law enforcement, limited progress has been made.  What can be done?  This is an open research topic that operations management and supply chain researchers should explore.  I plan to share some of my preliminary studies in this presentation.





(Host: Professor Chris Bauman)


Monday, February 1, 2016


Using Choice Architectue to Improve Energy Decisions


SPEAKER: Professor Rick Larrick

UNIVERSITY: Duke University 

TIME: 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5100, Corporate Partners Executive Boardroom 



This talk will describe a set of cognitive biases that lead people to misunderstand their energy use. The talk will review four principles of “choice architecture” derived from cognitive and social psychology for helping decision makers make better energy decisions. Brief research examples will be given in support of each.  The principles will also be illustrated more broadly as tools for helping employees and consumers make better decisions. 


(1) Do the calculations for decision makers. “Miles per gallon” (MPG) is a familiar efficiency metric used to evaluate automobiles in the United States.  However, gas consumption is a highly curvilinear function of MPG.  As a result, MPG leads people to severely underestimate the gas savings from small MPG improvements on inefficient cars. Calculating consumption for decision makers by using a measure such as “gallons per 100 miles” corrects this bias.


(2) Translate energy use to important objectives such as cost and environmental impact. People often fail to map energy use to other concerns, such as cost and environmental impact, because they lack knowledge or motivation.  Translations remind people of goals they care about and guide them to options they prefer. 


(3) Provide a meaningful relative comparison.   Relative comparisons help consumers evaluate whether an ambiguous energy number is good or bad. For instance, OPower has demonstrated that people reduce their energy use when given specific comparisons to average (and best) neighbors.  Other comparisons, such as ambitious but realistic goals, also lead to reduced energy use. 


(4) Use an expanded scale, such as lifetime cost (not daily cost).  People tend to ignore small numbers. To address this issue, energy-related numbers can be scaled to large but realistic time periods.  Research shows that people are more interested in energy efficient products when given costs on a longer time scale.







(Host: Professor Shuya Yin)


Friday, January 29, 2016


The Bright Side of Managerial Overconfidence


SPEAKER: Professor Juan Li

UNIVERSITY: Nanjing University 

TIME: 10:00 pm - 11:30 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5200, Lyman Porter Colloquia Room & Execu






A well-known behavior phenomenon is managers hold excessive faith that they know the truth. Managers may receive signals about market states, in which the states may be high or low, thus, the posterior probability of market state being high(low) with receiving a hit (bomb) signal is not smaller than the prior probability, managers may exhibit overconfidence on the accuracy of signals. The objective of this paper is to answer under which conditions overconfidence bias may lead to higher profits, the corresponding managerial insights for firms are whether to hire overconfident managers and how to estimate the value of signals in a competitive setting.

The paper shows firms’ differentiation strategies critically depend on how costly it enter market. When the fixed cost of entry is not too high, both firms would like to hire rational managers. However, for a larger fixed cost, counterintuitively, one of firms exploits to hire overconfident manager to differentiate their competition if the market states being high is relatively large, the main reason of overconfidence leading to higher profits is benefits from ordering more with receiving the hit signal are sufficiently large compared with loss from ordering less with receiving the bomb signal. The fact that hiring overconfident managers is stable in a wide range of environments may help to explain why overconfident managers remains prevalent, even if it contributes to decision bias. Furthermore, overconfidence bias leading to higher profits are robust even when market states belong to a normal distribution.




(Host: Professor John Joseph)


Friday, January 29, 2016


Vicarious Learning In Startups: Evidence From Accelerator Programs


SPEAKER: Professor Chris Bingham

UNIVERSITY: University of North Carolina

TIME: 2:00 pm - 3:30 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5100, Corporate Partners Executive Boardroom



A fundamental challenge for new startups is overcoming liabilities of newness - especially lack of experience and business understanding. Accelerators, intense, time-compressed entrepreneurial education programs, attempt to alleviate these critical liabilities by facilitating vicarious learning for participating new ventures. Yet, the organizations literature suggests that since new ventures lack experience and thus adequate levels of absorptive capacity to assimilate and integrate new knowledge, vicarious learning may be less effective. Using a multiple case, inductive study of eight US seed accelerator programs and affiliated startups, we address this tension and explore how accelerators may contribute to (or distract from) vicarious learning in startups.  Our data suggest how accelerators do both. Collectively, our findings contribute to strategy by introducing intermediaries that may broker vicarious learning for others, to organization theory by suggesting how startups can build initial absorptive capacity, and to entrepreneurship by demystifying how accelerators can help or harm venture development.






(Host: Professor Connie Pechmann)


Monday, January 25, 2016


"Only One Left - I'll Fight you for It!": Scarcity Promotion Advertising and Aggressive Behavior


SPEAKER: Dr. Darren Dahl

UNIVERSITY: Sauder School of Business

TIME: 1:00 pm - 2:30 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5200, Lyman Porter Colloquia Room and Executive Terrace



Marketers frequently use scarcity promotions, where a product or service is limited in either quantity or is promoted for a limited time. The present research shows that the mere exposure to scarcity promotion advertising can activate actual aggression even outside the consumption domain, when the scarce item is not even attainable. Further, exposure to scarcity promotion advertising prompts consumers to perceive other consumers (even if not physically present) as potential threats to obtaining a desired product. This threat, in turn, is shown to drive aggression towards others. Four studies using violent video game behavior to measure aggression demonstrate that firearm shooting behavior (number of shots fired), punching behavior (punches thrown), and consumer preferences for violent experiences are higher in response to such advertising.






(Host: Professor Ben Lourie)

Thursday, January 21, 2016

Attributes of Informative Disclosures


SPEAKER: Professor Daren Roulstone

UNIVERSITY: Ohio State University

TIME: 2:00 pm - 3:30 pm

LOCATION: SB1 2321, Judy Rosener Flexible Classroom



Regulatory actions and academic research suggest a variety of seemingly “good” disclosure attributes: readability, amount of forward-looking information, concreteness (numerical intensity), and more disclosure in general. While all of these attributes seem intuitively desirable, there is little empirical evidence about how these disclosure attributes compare in terms of informing the readers of financial reports. We examine equity market responses to quarterly earnings announcements as a function of these disclosure attributes and find substantial variation in their effects. We find strong evidence that forward-looking disclosures represent informative disclosures, very little evidence that readability is associated with disclosure informativeness, and actually find evidence that both disclosure length and numerical intensity are negatively associated with disclosure informativeness. We provide several reasons why these measured attributes may not capture disclosure quality as expected. Overall, our results should help inform both managers and regulators making decisions about how to craft or encourage informative disclosures. Our results also suggest caution for academics using seemingly intuitive measures of disclosure quality.






 (Host: Chong Huang)


Friday, January 15, 2016


Which Factors Matter to Investors? Evidence from Mutual Fund Flows.


SPEAKER: Professor Brad Barber


TIME: 1:30 pm-2:45 pm

LOCATION: SB1 5200, Lyman Porter Colloquia Room & Executive Terrace



When assessing a fund manager's skill, sophisticated investors will consider all factors (priced and unpriced) that explain cross-sectional variation in fund performance. We investigate which factors investors attend to by analyzing mutual fund flows as a function of recent returns. Investors attend most to market risk (beta), but treat returns attributable to size, value, momentum, and industry factors as alpha. Flows of direct-sold funds- whose investors are likely more sophisticated than those of broker-sold funds-are less responsive to factor-related returns, which suggests sophisticated investors are aware that factor-related returns are not indicative of managerial skill. 





(Host: Professor Luyi Gui)


Friday, January 15, 2016


Stringency, Governance, Media Coverage and Diffusion of Environmental and Social Labeling Schemes


SPEAKER: Professor Charles J. Corbett

UNIVERSITY: University of California, Los Angeles

TIME: 10:00 am - 11:30 am

LOCATION: SB1 5200, Lyman Porter Colloquia Room and Executive Terrace



The diffusion of ecolabels has been widespread, through adoption of individual labels by firms and consumers has varied widely. Little is known about why some labeling schemes are more widely adopted than others. One might speculate that firms prefer labels with less stringent requirement, as they are less costly to adopt. Conversely, firls may prefer to associate themselves with a label that is sufficiently well-governed to minimize the risk of negative publicity emerging about other firms carrying that smae label. the notion "well-governed" itself is also not well-defined. Finally, one might speculate that labels which receive favorable coverage in the media are likely to be more widely adopted, and that labels which are more stringent and better-governed are more likely to attract such favorable coverage. We explore these linkages (between stringency, governace, and media coverage and adoption) using three sources of data. We analyze 40 enviromental and social labeling schemes, using and other sources to code their governance practices. We conducted a survey of 67 experts from governments, major retailers, NGOs, consultancies. and academia, around the world, to determine stringency, quality of  governance, and breadth of adoption. Finally, we analayzed 3043 media articles on these 40 schemes, to determine the tenor of media coverage.


We find that only accreditation of verifiers is associated with a better overall quality of governance. We also find that labels that are better-governed are also more widely adopted, consistent with the expectation that firms are more wary of joining labels with weal governance. On the other hand, labels that are more stringent are not less widely adopted, suggesting that (within the range of stringency included in our sample) labels do not suffer by imposing stricter requirements. We find that the tenor of the media coverage of a label does not depend on its stringency, on most specific governance practices, or its overall quality of governance. Only an open and consensus-based standard-setting process is associated with more favorable media coverage. More favorable media coverage is not, however, associated with wider adoption. Overall our findings point to "reassurance" as a key part pf governance of ecolabels, whether in the form of accreditation of verifiers, or participation of many stakeholders in the standard-setting process.