TEMPORALITY IN NEGOTIATIONS: 
A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses national differences in the interpretation of time in mixed motive decision contexts, such as negotiation. Specifically, we consider how members of different national cultures (Portugal, Turkey, and the United States) experience temporality in these situations. We argue that cultural temporality such as polychronicity, future orientation, and uncertainty avoidance form part of a broader national environment. The national environment is also expressed in national stability factors such as legal systems, family ties, and homogeneity of populations. We propose that temporality and stability aspects of national environment determine negotiation paradigms, which subsequently influence temporality in negotiations. We conclude by suggesting that inclusion of complex and interdependent national environment factors in the study of negotiation has the potential to substantially advance our understanding of negotiations.

As national borders become increasingly open to international trade, foreign investments, and cross-national partnerships, successfully negotiating in different cultures becomes critical to organizational success. In the last two
decades, academics have given increased attention to how cultural differences influence negotiation processes and outcomes (e.g., Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992; Harnett & Cummings, 1980; Tung, 1982). One apparent conceptual gap in this research deals with the construct of time. Although a number of studies have examined negotiation behavior cross-culturally, only limited progress has been made in understanding how cultural views of time can influence negotiation behavior. To our knowledge, Foster’s (1992) research is the only work that comparatively explores temporality in intra-cultural negotiations. Foster examined the behaviors of different cultures such as Mexicans, French, Asians, and people in the U.S., and provided a narrative of how these cultures behave in a negotiation context in relation to time, such as their attention to deadlines or the extent to which they juggle several negotiation issues at the same time.

Individuals’ interpretations of time are likely to become salient in a number of situations, such as when negotiations involve deadlines by which an agreement has to be reached, when negotiations are one-time vs multiple-time events, or when negotiations involve explicit temporal dependencies. One circumstance in which negotiations involve explicit temporal dependencies is when the outcomes of negotiated agreements are implemented at a future date. For instance, a negotiator may strike a deal on the price of a product today but not receive the product for some time. Existing research on delays has shown that when the temporal distance between a negotiation and its outcome increases, parties tend to reach more efficient agreements (Okhuysen, Galinksy, & Uptigrove, 2003). Okhuysen et al. (2003) speculated that this is due to decreased contentiousness in the negotiation when the outcomes are delayed, due to discounting. Although these types of temporal constraints are a common experience for negotiators around the world, existing research on temporality in negotiations has yet to uncover the factors that underlie the negotiation experience in different cultural settings.

Since individuals’ understandings of time are culturally constructed (Hall, 1959; Hall & Hall, 1990), differences in negotiation processes and outcomes across cultures are likely to be observed when negotiations involve temporal constraints such as delayed outcomes or deadlines. In this paper, we suggest that national-level environmental factors, including aspects of national stability and cultural temporality, lead to the development of national-level negotiation paradigms. These three elements, in turn, affect individual-level factors, such as the perceptions of time, negotiation processes, and negotiation outcomes. With national-level environmental factors, we refer to Guisinger’s (2001) GEOVALENT dimensions of econography (economy
and geography), culture, legal systems, income profile, political risk, tax systems, exchange rates, and government restrictions. We define national stability as the environmental conditions that pertain to the steadiness and the strength of political, legal, economic, and social institutions in a given nation. We describe cultural temporality as the way in which cultures perceive time and the consequent attitudes, preferences, and behaviors individuals in these cultures display in relation to time. Finally, we define negotiation paradigms as the shared cognitive representations of individuals in a given nation, which individuals use to make sense of the negotiation activity.

We illustrate our discussion using three countries as exemplars: Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. Prior research has shown that these countries differ in a number of important dimensions including those on the national (e.g., temporality) (Hall, 1959, 1989) and individual (e.g., uncertainty avoidance) (Hofstede, 1980) levels of analysis. According to the results of the GLOBE project (see Ashkanasy, Trevor-Roberts, & Earnshaw, 2002; Jesuino, 2002), Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. belong to separate clusters of nations (Latin Europe cluster, Arabic cluster, and the Anglo clusters, respectively), allowing us to use them as representations of these three clusters. Fig. 1 portrays our conceptual model of how the factors we discussed above relate to one another.

Our interest in negotiation stems from its role as a mixed-motive, collective decision-making process. Negotiation involves collaboration in the desire to create value as well as competition in the desire to claim value (Lax & Sebenius, 1992). Negotiation also includes interdependence between par-

![Fig. 1. Model of Cultural Components of Negotiation Related to Temporality.](image-url)
ties, as behaviors by one party can easily affect other participating parties (Thompson, 1998). Additionally, the process of negotiation involves two or more parties (i.e., individuals, groups, or organizations; Lewicki, Saunders, Barry, & Minton, 2004), highlighting situations where the social nature of decision making is important such that the outcome of the collaborative decision-making effort depends on the interactions that occur between the parties. As such, we consider negotiation a special case of collective decision processes, such as group decision making.

This paper contributes to the existing literature in three primary ways. First, we explore the differences in temporal views that affect negotiations in different national cultures, which have received scant attention in the literature (see Foster, 1992). Second, we emphasize the role of nation-level environmental factors, which encompass not only the national culture (e.g., cultural views on time) but also the political, legal, economic, and social institutions in a given nation to explain temporal perspectives. Third, we propose that it is through negotiation paradigms that environmental factors influence temporal preferences, attitudes, and behaviors in negotiations. The legal, economic, and social realities of nations help create cognitive representations of how to think about and approach negotiations, which then influences parties’ temporal preferences and behaviors.

In this paper, we first examine the environmental factors of national stability and cultural temporality that pertain to the negotiation experiences in different national cultures, specifically in Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. We then present national-level negotiation paradigms with an emphasis on differences in negotiation processes and outcomes across these national cultures. We follow with a discussion of the linkages among environmental factors and how they impact temporality in negotiations by influencing the negotiation paradigms individuals’ hold. We conclude with a discussion including implications for negotiations and avenues for future research.

CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION

Although an ideal literature review for this paper would encompass research that explored the influence of culture on temporality in intra-cultural negotiations, such a literature is scarce (see Foster, 1992). Therefore, our literature review in this section will rely heavily on existing work that examines the influence of culture on negotiation behaviors and outcomes. Through this literature review, we aim to highlight some of the ways in which national cultures can affect negotiation styles, behaviors, and outcomes. Following
this literature, we suggest in later sections that cultures also differ in how they view time in negotiation contexts, and we explore the factors that affect these temporal views.

Research on the effect of culture on negotiations has commonly contrasted the styles of negotiators from different national cultures. Much of this work has compared U.S. negotiators to Chinese negotiators. For example, Adler et al. (1992) found that Chinese negotiators tended to ask questions and to interrupt more frequently than their U.S. counterparts. In terms of expressing conflict, Tse, Francis, and Walls (1994) showed that Chinese negotiators were more likely to avoid expressions of conflict than were U.S. negotiators. In their survey, Morris et al. (1998) found that, when managing conflict, Chinese managers relied more heavily on an avoiding style (e.g., avoiding expressions of conflict) due to their emphasis on conformity and tradition, whereas U.S. managers relied more heavily on a competing style (e.g., being assertive in making demands) due to their emphasis on individual achievement. Finally, Tinsley and Pillutla (1998) found that U.S. negotiators were more likely to display both self-interest norms aimed at maximizing one’s own gain and joint problem-solving norms aimed at maximizing joint gain, whereas Chinese negotiators were more likely to subscribe to an equality norm aimed at distributing the outcomes equally.

Other research has focused on contrasting negotiation styles of U.S. negotiators with those of Brazilian and Japanese negotiators. For example, Graham (1985) found that U.S. negotiators tended to make larger initial concessions than the Japanese, but that Brazilian negotiators tended to be more “greedy” in their first offers than either of the two. Gelfand et al. (2001) showed that as compared to people from the U.S., Japanese perceived conflicts as more compromise-focused. Adair et al. (2001) found that U.S. negotiators exchanged information directly, whereas the Japanese negotiators exchanged information indirectly.

Inter- and intracultural negotiation research has also studied negotiation tactics in conjunction with individual or joint gains of negotiators. Graham (1983) found that deceptive information from an opponent decreased negotiation outcomes for U.S. negotiators, whereas deceptive bargaining strategies enhanced individual profits for Brazilian negotiators, concluding that dishonest opponents could take advantage of U.S. negotiators. Adair et al. (2004) showed that cultures that utilized direct information-sharing strategies or a combination of indirect and direct strategies maximized their joint gains. Finally, Tinsley and Pillutla (1998) found that U.S. negotiators reported higher levels of satisfaction when they maximized joint gain and
Chinese negotiators were happier when they attained outcome parity. Overall, these differences highlight the differential outcomes that negotiators attain depending on the particular negotiation style they ascribe to within their culture.

Although this research is helpful in establishing cultural differences across nations, there is very little work considering the effect of culture on temporality in negotiations. Foster (1992) examined the negotiation behaviors of peoples from the U.S., Mexicans, French, and Asians in relation to time. He discussed how, for example, people in the U.S. are comfortable discussing things in an orderly fashion, whereas Mexicans discuss more than one point at the same time. Mexicans tend to interrupt one another and sometimes even act emotionally when they need to emphasize a point. He also discussed how to the French, the quality of a project is more important than meeting its deadline, whereas people in the U.S. tend to emphasize deadlines to a greater degree. In this paper, we add to Foster’s work by suggesting other temporal preferences and behaviors different cultures display as they make decisions in negotiation contexts.

NATIONAL STABILITY AND TEMPORALITY IN NEGOTIATIONS

Table 1 provides a brief summary of how Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. compare on a variety of important aspects of national environment including religion, government, and economy. Other important differences also distinguish these countries and its citizens, such as the differences in societal values of human development, power distance, and performance orientation (see the GLOBE project; Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Jesuino, 2002; Trevor-Roberts & Earnshaw, 2002). Furthermore, these three countries and their citizens also vary in terms of individualism–collectivism, with Portugal at the collectivist end of this scale, the U.S. at the individualistic end, and Turkey ranking as a moderately collectivistic society (Cavusgil, Civi, Tutek, & Dalgic, 2003). We argue that the differences between these countries in terms of the broader national environment meaningfully distinguish these nations from one another in significant ways relevant to negotiation.

In this section, we advance three dimensions of national stability that are likely to play an important role in temporal views in negotiations across different national cultures. We define national stability as the environmental conditions pertaining to the strength and consistency of political, economic,
and institutional norms and realities in a given nation. For the purposes of understanding temporality in negotiations within cultures, we select aspects of the environment that directly pertain to temporality in negotiations: institutional systems, relationships, and national homogeneity.
Institutional Systems and Temporality in Negotiations

One important element in national cultures is the institutional environment. Institutional actors are social groups that exert some overarching influence on how national culture is expressed. Examples of institutional actors can include churches, national governments, regulatory bodies, and the armed forces. These institutions are important because they can provide stability, which is critical as individuals assess the predictability of the future. For example, some have suggested that the Israeli army, with its forced conscription, provides a common experience for all Israeli citizens. Institutions within countries, however, are not always stable. In Turkey, for example, one can observe frequent state intervention in business life through unpredictable policy changes, which creates uncertainty for private companies that remain highly dependent on the state for financial incentives (Kabasakal & Bodur, 1998). The instability of institutional actors can create an absence of behavioral guidance (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). If institutional actors cannot guarantee stability in the national environment, then individuals face an unpredictable future.

Institutional actors can determine the feasibility of negotiating, for instance, through their influence on how negotiators view the future. Legal systems are one example of a set of institutional actors that can affect how individuals see the future. Legal systems can be quite different and include systems based on common law, civil law, religious law, and many hybrid forms (LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). One element that distinguishes these systems is the extent to which they protect investors through processes that provide for the enforcement of contracts. Higher levels of protection reduce the uncertainty involved in investment and increase the predictability of the future by providing an institutionalized process to fall back on in situations where, for example, agreements are not fulfilled. It is the ability to rely on institutional actors that allows individuals and organizations to negotiate for future outcomes even though the future, in its very essence, is unpredictable.

As an example of how different legal systems can impact temporality in negotiations, consider the case of a buyer and a seller that involves the delivery of merchandise at a later date. In this situation, two considerations may be relevant. First, whether or not the buyer can count on the seller to deliver at the appointed time, and second, whether or not the seller can count on payment after delivery. Even in such a simple situation, a strong and effective legal protection of contracts and property can be an important enabler of agreements, because it is a critical factor in the enforcement of
agreements. Thus, in a country with a strong judicial system, a retailer will want to be able to enforce the contract and to take action if a supplier does not deliver the merchandise at the appointed time. Similarly, the buyer can count on the legal system to guarantee payment.

In Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S., the legal systems operate in different ways, potentially leading to differences in the way individuals view the future and thus the way in which the legal system enables agreements for delayed outcomes. For example, a central tenet of the U.S. legal system (a common law system) is that justice must be quick, that “justice delayed is justice denied.” In this respect, the U.S. legal system is quite different from the legal systems in Portugal (a civil law system) and Turkey (a law system derived from various European legal systems), where civil disputes can take a long time to settle. One potential consequence of the differences in legal systems is that individuals in Turkey and Portugal may be less likely to rely on the judicial system as a guarantor of agreements that involve delays compared to individuals in the U.S. In turn, negotiators in Turkey and Portugal may prefer and provide incentives for negotiated agreements that involve an immediate realization of outcomes (such as preferring cash payments rather than credit or other forms of delayed payments), even providing price reductions for those parties willing to pay up front. In some cases, making cash payments may be the only option available to the buyer. In contrast, negotiators in the U.S. may be much more willing to provide delayed payment options to buyers due to a greater ability to rely on the judicial system in the event of a default.

Relationships and Temporality in Negotiations

Family ties and close relationships are another element of national stability that can exert a strong influence on how transactions occur in a society. In particular, the existence of strong ties in families, including the extended family, friendships, and other close-knit groups, can serve to reduce uncertainty for individuals. For example, some scholars have speculated that close relationships can substitute for other governance mechanisms, such as contractual safeguards, by providing an alternative mechanism based on trust (Gulati, 1995; Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; Heide, 1994; Inkpen & Currall, 1998; Parkhe, 1993; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). In negotiation contexts, close relationships can reduce the uncertainty associated with the implementation of agreements.
Close relationships can reduce the risk and the uncertainty regarding the implementation of negotiated agreements by providing trust among the parties involved in the negotiation. However, close relationships may have another interesting temporal effect. Some have observed that one way to establish or build close relationships is by extending trust. In these situations, it is more likely that an actor will find it acceptable to fulfill his or her part of an agreement without immediate reciprocity, using the delay of payment, or an unfulfilled promise, as an opportunity to build the relationship. That is, the acceptability of a delay in payment in these conditions, on its own, can become a trust-building exercise. This delay, by engendering trust, can also increase the confidence in partner cooperation (Das & Teng, 1998). Although the expectation for the other party to implement their part of the agreement at a future date is there, the actual implementation time may be quite uncertain. In such a system of relationships, each transaction is embedded in a deeper network of interactions, both past and future.

One example of how family ties or other close relationships can influence the negotiation of delayed outcomes is the case of a buyer and a seller involving the payment for a used car. One can assume that the seller’s main concern is receiving payment for the car. In a situation where family or other relationship networks are strong, they may not rely on a contract, but on a verbal agreement instead. To the extent that a strong direct or indirect relationship exists between the parties, the seller is more likely to trust the buyer. In addition, the seller may be willing to accommodate the buyer by delaying the payment to preserve or enhance the existing relationships, perhaps by showing kindness and generosity. Situations such as this highlight the important point that negotiation outcomes often involve factors exogenous to the negotiation per se, including the preservation of social ties, which may be differentially valued based on national culture.

In Turkey, Portugal, and the U.S., family and friendship ties take different forms and may lead to differences in individuals’ reliance on networks of family and friends. For instance, the U.S. is known for its strong individualistic orientation (Hofstede, 1980). In this respect, the U.S. orientation to family and other close relationships is quite different from that in Portugal, where there is a strong sense of loyalty to an extended network of family and friends, and where some have noted a weaker “civic sense” toward the larger community (Osland, Franco, & Osland, 1999). As Cheke (1953, p. 45) noted, “the Portuguese is kind and charitable to five categories of persons: to his family, to his friends, to the friends of his family, to the friends of his friends, and lastly, to the beggar in his path.”
In Turkey, the network of interdependent relationships includes family, regional origin, and school affiliation, and carries great importance. This network gains even more importance in Turkey due to the influence of Islam, which places great value in a collectivist culture (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002). Consequently, we propose that in Turkey, delaying payments and extending generosity in this way to enhance existing relationships among parties is likely to be more common than in Portugal where these types of generous behaviors will be mostly observed among friends and family. Improving existing relationships serves the purpose of enlarging one’s network of relationships, creating opportunities for new business and personal relationships. In contrast, in the U.S., intentional delays will be less frequently observed as compared to Portugal or Turkey because maintaining relationships may be less of a concern due to an individualistic orientation.

National Homogeneity and Temporality in Negotiations

The extent of homogeneity within a national population is another aspect of national stability, and may have important implications for how transactions are conducted in a society. Populations that are relatively homogeneous in terms of background, language, religion, historical traditions, education, ethnicity, and so forth are more likely to have widely shared schemas to understand the world. Shared schemas may assist individuals in crafting agreements because individuals may share an understanding for what each party’s expectations are concerning the negotiation. For example, in some cultures, negotiating over certain commodities is expected and prices are deliberately kept at a higher level with the expectation that the potential buyer will negotiate the price. Sharing similar expectations, both the buyer and the seller go into the negotiation prepared for the negotiation to take place, attenuating conflict that can arise due to differential expectations.

Shared schemas as derived from homogeneity in the population may help individuals craft agreements for delayed outcomes because individuals share many of the concerns about the future, and thus these concerns may be implicitly accounted for in the agreements that are reached. For example, suppose that a country suffers a financial crisis and currency devaluation. An event of this type can be a severe shock to an economic system. Consider, for instance, how the Great Depression in the U.S. affected an entire generation’s view of savings, waste, and personal sacrifice. The events that could precipitate such a crisis, its resolution, and the recovery from it are
likely to be events that are shared by many individuals within that society. This shared history can create a mutual understanding of expectations and preferences concerning future outcomes and lead to cooperative behavior for delayed issues.

Portugal is a more homogeneous society with regard to values, preferences, and behaviors than either Turkey or the U.S. Portugal’s homogeneity comes from its small population residing in a small land area compared to Turkey or the U.S. In Turkey, one can observe a multiplicity of ideologies that emerge from ethnic and regional differences. This heterogeneity of cultures within a single country creates a diversity that blends traditional and modern values, secular and Islamic ideologies, and Eastern and Western perspectives (Kabasakal & Bodur, 1998).

Due to its sheer population size, geographic magnitude, and tradition as a haven for immigrants, the U.S. displays even greater diversity, with its extreme mix of cultures, religions, and peoples. We propose that individuals in a country like Portugal, where greater homogeneity exists, may be able to rely on common understandings to develop agreements that involve delayed outcomes more than individuals in Turkey or the U.S. These agreements are more likely, in addition, to include implicit and explicit elements that account for the shared experience of the Portuguese. In particular, this reliance on common understandings may be more effective than relying on the legal system, like negotiators in the U.S. might be expected to do. Furthermore, we suggest that when negotiating for delays themselves, a common understanding of expectations and preferences in Portugal is likely to allow for an accommodation of each party’s concerns on how great a delay is desirable, whereas this accommodation is less likely to be observed in places such as Turkey or the U.S., where shared understandings exist to a lesser degree.

In this section, we introduced the concept of national stability and three ways in which national cultures differ in national stability. In addition, we discussed the consequent temporal preferences and behaviors individuals in different national cultures display in negotiations. We suggested that institutional, relationship, and population characteristics of a society affect temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiation. In the next section, we introduce the notion of cultural temporality and how it affects negotiations.
CULTURAL TEMPORALITY AND TEMPORALITY IN NEGOTIATIONS

We now focus on another aspect of the broader national environment, the temporal culture, and its impact on negotiations conducted in different national cultures. We define cultural temporality as the ways in which people in different cultures perceive time and their consequent attitudes, preferences, and behaviors in relation to time. Given our focus on understanding temporality in negotiations across different cultural settings, considering the temporal dimension of national culture is central to our discussion. We suggest that temporal dimensions of the national culture influence negotiators’ perceptions of time. Prior research has identified a number of time-related factors that are culture-specific, such as polychronicity, future orientation, and uncertainty avoidance. These factors are manifested in individuals’ perceptions of time. In the following section, we explore these temporal factors and their impact on negotiations.

Polychronicity and Temporality in Negotiations

Hall (1959) introduced the concept of polychronicity to describe how different cultures use and view time. He suggested that people in polychronic cultures tend to have a preference for doing many things at once or, in other words, for multi-tasking. This “multi-tasking” behavior enables individuals to easily combine personal and professional lives. Also, in polychronic cultures human relationships are emphasized over schedules. In contrast, individuals in monochronic cultures tend to prefer doing one thing at a time, and generally place greater emphasis on schedules and the need to keep them. Hall (1989) further associated polychronicity with the intangibility of time, noting that in polychronic cultures individuals are less likely to speak of time as being spent, wasted, or lost. Latin cultures and Eastern cultures tend to be polychronic. Individuals in these cultures often prefer doing several things at a time and are not as concerned about deadlines as Western cultures are. Western cultures tend to be more monochronic such that people in these countries tend to prefer focusing on one thing at a time and greatly emphasize punctuality (Hall, 1959, 1989).

Individuals in polychronic cultures are likely to display negotiating behaviors consistent with the temporal characteristics of their culture, which emphasize multi-tasking, during negotiating. They are likely to negotiate
over multiple issues at a time rather than over one issue at a time. Consequently, individuals in polychronic cultures may be more likely to find the integrative potential in an agreement by making trade-offs among issues compared to monochronic cultures, where individuals are likely to focus on one issue at a time. In addition, given that polychronic cultures do not speak of time as spent or lost, individuals in these cultures are likely to go through lengthier negotiations compared to those in monochronic cultures, where there is a greater awareness of the passage of time and where individuals are likely to end negotiations after a specified period of time even if a decision is not yet reached. Longer duration negotiations may also facilitate the creation or strengthening of personal relationships. Furthermore, we suggest that individuals from polychronic cultures are likely to multi-task and focus on both negotiation-specific concerns and outside concerns, such as personal issues, during negotiations. Outside concerns can create distraction and prevent individuals from focusing fully on the task at hand. Overall, although polychronicity may be associated with greater logrolling, it may also be associated with lengthier negotiations and greater interference of personal matters with the negotiation task compared to monochronicity. Conversely, monochronic cultures are likely to focus on the task, which is the negotiation itself, not allowing personal or other outside matters to interfere with the negotiation. This can allow for a more focused and attentive way of approaching the negotiation process.

Latin cultures (e.g., the Portuguese culture) and Eastern cultures (e.g., the Turkish culture) are polychronic cultures, whereas Western cultures such as the U.S. culture tend to be monochronic (Hall, 1989). Accordingly, we argue that Portuguese and the Turkish negotiators are more likely to tackle multiple issues at once in a multi-issue negotiation compared to U.S. negotiators, who are more likely to tackle one issue at a time. In addition, given their polychronic nature and consequent lack of attention to the passage of time, one can expect the Eastern and Latin cultures to go through a rather lengthy negotiation process, perhaps involving activities such as business lunches and dinners, as part of building a trusting relationship in the negotiation (see Cavusgil et al., 2003, for Turkey). In these situations, negotiations may reach impasse or the agreement might remain vague, but the process may also be expected to pick up again at a later time. In contrast, U.S. negotiators may be more likely to adhere to deadlines and attempt to finalize negotiations after a predetermined period.
Future Orientation and Temporality in Negotiations

Future orientation refers to the extent to which individuals in societies engage in behaviors focused on the future such as planning, investing in the future, or delaying gratification (House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 2001; House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). An orientation to the future both influences environmental factors such as national stability, legal environment, or religion, and is also influenced by these factors. Factors such as institutional systems, historical heritage, economic development, governance or religion can reinforce the way the present, past, and the future are viewed by people of different cultures. For example, in cultures that adhere to the Muslim faith, one can observe a short-term orientation and lack of planning and forecasting, since believing in fate as a basic principle of faith in God involves accepting all conduct that occurred in the past or that will occur in the future (Ilmihal, 1999), which is prearranged and perhaps preordained by God (Kabasakal & Dastmalchian, 2001). Economic hardship can also turn people’s attention to the present and prevent individuals from making plans regarding the future if it is perceived as uncertain and bleak.

The extent to which a negotiator is culturally oriented toward the future can affect both the negotiation process and outcome. For example, in negotiation, a strong future orientation can increase negotiators’ focus on issues with delayed outcomes and increase the competition over these issues. Lack of cooperation over delayed issues can increase the chances of reaching impasse or prevent negotiators from identifying the integrative potential in an agreement. Further, compared to those in present-oriented cultures, negotiators embedded in future-oriented cultures may be more likely to take into account future opportunities with their counterparts, allowing trade-offs to take place between the present and the future.

Research initiated by the GLOBE project suggests that the U.S. residents are higher in future orientation than Turks, who are slightly higher than the Portuguese (Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Jesuino, 2002; Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002). A strong future orientation in the U.S. can be attributed to the tendency of thinking of the future as greater, bigger, better, and more prosperous than the present (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), which is perhaps largely reinforced by the strength of the economy and the U.S. status as the world’s only superpower (Ashkanasy et al., 2002). On the other hand, economic hardships along with Islamic roots and a consequent belief in “fate” (Kabasakal & Dastmalchian, 2001) reinforces a more present-orientation in Turkey. The Portuguese tend to be oriented to the past due to
a somewhat recent history of economic hardships that contrasts with a far more glorious colonial past. We propose that negotiators in the U.S. are more likely to assume a competitive stance when negotiating over delayed issues compared to negotiators in Turkey or Portugal because negotiators in the U.S. tend to be more future-oriented (Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Jesuino, 2002; Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002) and, therefore, may discount the value of delayed outcomes to a lesser degree, placing relatively more emphasis on issues with delayed outcomes. Further, negotiators in the U.S. may be more likely to trade-off present negotiations for future ones compared to Turkey or Portugal. In other words, negotiators in the U.S. are likely to concede to the other party in a present, less important negotiation while expecting a return from the other party in a more important future negotiation. Naturally, such a relationship would be moderated by the strength of the relationships between the parties.

Uncertainty Avoidance and Temporality in Negotiations

Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which individuals strive to avoid ambiguity by relying on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices (House et al., 2001). Societies that are oriented to the future also try to avoid the ambiguity the future entails. Future-oriented societies tend to be heavily involved in planning, forecasting, and investing in the future (House et al., 2001, 2002), which serve to minimize the negative impact of an ambiguous future on the present. Similar to an orientation to the future, the level of uncertainty avoidance in a society is likely to be heavily affected by stability factors. Institutional systems, historical heritage, economic development, or religion can shape the way time is viewed by people of different cultures and how they view and deal with uncertainty. For example, people in a country battered by a history of economic crises are likely to get used to uncertainty as it is a part of daily life. Conversely, a stable economy creates the perception of a more certain future and any uncertainty is likely to be mitigated through extensive planning and forecasting.

The degree of uncertainty avoidance in a society can affect temporal preferences in a negotiation context. Compared to negotiators from a culture that is acceptant of uncertainty, negotiators from an uncertainty avoidant culture may be more competitive when negotiating over delayed issues, because delayed issues carry more uncertainty in their implementation. Moreover, negotiators from cultures that avoid uncertainty may assign
more risk to future outcomes than present ones, whereas those that embrace uncertainty are likely to assign less risk due to a lower level of desire to control the effect of the future on their present decisions.

Research has shown that the Turks are generally more tolerant of uncertainty than the Portuguese, who are more tolerant of uncertainty than individuals from the U.S. (Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Jesuino, 2002; Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002). Turks are less avoidant of uncertainty compared to individuals from the U.S., perhaps due to Turkey's roots in Islam and individuals' need to maintain a strong relationship with the family and other closely knit groups (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002). These networks of close relationships may provide the security the Turks need to cope with ambiguity. On the other hand, what is distinctive and peculiar about Portugal is the "paternalistic role attributed to the state" which is expected to "regulate, educate and protect its subjects" (Jesuino, 2002, p. 84). Within Portuguese society, the state assumes the protector role and provides a "safety net" from uncertainty. In contrast, the individualistic nature of the U.S. seems to leave little room for the immediate family or other members of the community to protect individuals from uncertainty. Instead, individuals in the U.S. tend to rely on processes and institutions focused on planning. These differences across national cultures in how uncertainty is viewed can impact negotiations. In particular, Turks may be more cooperative when negotiating over delayed issues than immediate ones, as they are more likely to embrace ambiguous situations, compared to the Portuguese, who in turn will be more cooperative than individuals in the U.S. In addition, due to differences in uncertainty avoidance in Turkey, Portugal, and the U.S, negotiators from these cultures can create agreements that involve conditional agreements tied to risk preferences, where Turks take more risks than the Portuguese who take more risks than individuals from the U.S.

In this section, we have described three elements of cultural temporality: polychronicity, future orientation, and uncertainty avoidance. These temporal factors have been previously examined to understand how societies view time (e.g., Hall, 1989; House et al., 2001). We have extended previous work to explore the potential impact of cultural temporality on temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiations. We have suggested that cultural temporality may have an influence on individuals' perceptions of time, and, therefore, may have consequences for individuals' temporal preferences and behaviors during negotiation.
NEGOTIATION PARADIGMS, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES

In this section, we explore negotiation paradigms observed in different cultures as a mechanism to explain how cultural temporality affects temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiations. We describe three aspects of the negotiation experience in day-to-day life in Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. to explore how the national environment can affect temporality in negotiation. These descriptions highlight ways in which different countries reflect different contextual environments within which negotiation takes place. We argue that different countries, by merit of their different cultural influences, develop paradigms of negotiation that are defined by shared conceptions of how, when, and under what circumstances negotiations should take place. Here, we define negotiation paradigms as shared cognitive representations that individuals in a given culture hold and that are used to make sense of the negotiation activity. These negotiation paradigms influence the specific processes and outcomes associated with temporality in any given negotiation.

Negotiating as a Common vs. Uncommon Activity and Temporality in Negotiations

In some cultural settings, individuals negotiate frequently because this may be the only way to achieve one’s goals. In other settings, negotiating may not be as common. In Portugal, for instance, negotiating tends to be perceived as awkward and somewhat unnatural, and it is not an everyday task. The Portuguese are not used to negotiating, perhaps as a legacy of a half-century-old dictatorship (Rafael, 1994), which involved a controlling autocratic regime and a high degree of state intervention in all aspects of economic life (Nunes & Montanheiro, 1997). Negotiating opportunities are limited in Portugal, circumscribed to a limited number of places or interactions (e.g., feiras – mobile agglomerations of vendors that sell everything from food products to clothes, furniture, or small domestic appliances). In stark contrast, bargaining is an integral aspect of a Turk’s day-to-day activity. As Cavusgil et al. (2003) remarked, bargaining is a national hobby in Turkey and people frequently negotiate. These negotiations range from bargaining for consumables such as clothing or photocopies to larger-scale items such as a house or car. Finally, individuals from the U.S. are most
likely to bargain when acquiring big-ticket items or during major life events, such as changing employers (i.e., job negotiations).

Individuals acquire experience in negotiating over time. In a culture where negotiating is a common occurrence, individuals acquire experience more readily. Experience can lead to being more willing and proactive in communicating needs and desires to the other party. In addition, one would expect experienced negotiators to have a greater awareness as to when they, or the other party, will walk away from a negotiation. Because negotiating is less fearsome for experienced negotiators, they may be more assertive in their temporal preferences when negotiating with a party with less initiative and experience. For example, they may be less likely to delay gratification by demanding a quick implementation. Moreover, experienced parties are less likely to give up on their demands and are likely to continue haggling until a satisfactory agreement is reached. Overall, we argue that individuals from the U.S. and Portugal are likely to be less proactive in communicating needs and desires to the other party while taking less time to reach an agreement than the Turks.

Negotiating as a Process vs. an Outcome and Temporality in Negotiations

Another difference in how negotiation takes place across countries is related to whether there is a primary focus on the process or the outcome. For the Portuguese, personal negotiations, as infrequent as they may be, have to be considered in the context of relationships. The Portuguese tend to value long-term relationships, as reflected in their collectivistic nature (Hofstede, 1980). Bargaining, especially over distributive issues, where one’s gain is the other’s loss, can be particularly tricky and needs to be carried out with great caution so as not to sever relationships. Although Portuguese executives at large companies tend to assume an aggressive and practical stance in business dealings, most small-and medium-sized businesses are less financially aggressive and place high importance on trust and personal loyalty (Rafael, 1994). Overall, for the Portuguese, the handling of the negotiation seems to be as important, if not more important, than the outcome of the negotiation.

In Turkey, the bargaining process is considered an enjoyable experience (Cavusgil et al., 2003). Although the end-result of a negotiation is important, the process of negotiating is perceived as a natural and well-appreciated aspect of daily life. In the context of business dealings, Turks use business lunches and dinners as opportunities to develop a relationship, and reciprocating is crucial (Cavusgil et al., 2003). In contrast to both Portugal
and Turkey, individuals in the U.S. tend to focus on “the bottom line.” Americans strive to get the best deal and, hence, emphasize the outcome over the process. Given that the U.S. is characterized as an individualistic, achievement-oriented, and performance-driven culture where individuals display high degrees of independence (Ashkanasy, et al., 2002), it is not surprising that a strong performance orientation during bargaining can often be observed. Attempts to get the best end-result in negotiations may also be linked to the assertiveness (i.e., the extent to which societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships, see House et al., 2002) of the U.S. culture, which is considered to be high on this dimension (Ashkanasy et al., 2002).

Cultures that view negotiating as a process rather than an outcome are likely to invest more effort in building relationships and preparing for potential future negotiations compared to cultures that place primary importance on the outcome. Given the importance of building the relationship, negotiation deadlines may be taken less seriously. Viewing negotiating as an outcome, on the other hand, makes the handling of negotiation more efficient, such that negotiators are likely to invest less time reaching an agreement because building the relationship is not an integral part of the negotiation process. We argue that due to an outcome orientation in the U.S., one can observe a more efficient way of handling the negotiation process by reaching an agreement more swiftly, compared to Portugal or Turkey. In Portugal or Turkey, individuals are likely to focus on efficiently managing the relationship rather than the negotiation outcome per se.

Negotiating as a Rational vs. an Emotional Process and Temporality in Negotiations

Whereas in some cultures individuals may refrain from expressing emotion, in others open conflict and loud argumentation are an integral (and even enjoyable) aspect of negotiating (Cavusgil et al., 2003). Negotiating in Portugal seems largely based on rational exchanges of arguments. Using rational arguments, the Portuguese bargain at a professional level rather than a personal level, which is not surprising since Portuguese tend to be somewhat formal (Rafael, 1994). At the same time, given the collectivist nature of the Portuguese (Hofstede, 1980), this professional style of negotiating is also amenable to the protection of personal relationships, which may be reflected in emotional aspects of negotiation. Turks, on the other hand, tend to debate and be argumentative as they embrace conflict. In Turkish, the very
word “negotiation” translates as pazarlik, which implies a heated, animated, haggling process (Cavusgil et al., 2003). This complements the high levels of aggressiveness in the Turkish society (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002), which is likely to make Turks low on conflict avoiding behaviors during negotiations.

In the U.S., expressions of emotion can sometimes be thought of as inappropriate and negotiations can be carried out in a more rational and less emotional manner. The individualistic nature of the culture in the U.S. (Hofstede, 1980) emphasizes a self that is not attached to others, perhaps allowing a more rational way of dealing with one’s negotiation partner.

Important differences mark the influence of negotiating as a rational vs. an emotional process on temporal preferences in negotiation. A rational way of negotiating allows viewing time in blocks, as something that cannot be wasted or spent. Therefore, a rational negotiator may only invest time on negotiating as it is deemed necessary. In addition, because a rational negotiator is likely to evaluate a block of time in the future similar to a block of time in the present, he or she may be more likely to envision the impact of future outcomes on current decisions. We suggest that when negotiating over delayed outcomes, rational negotiators such as those in the U.S. are likely to discount the future less compared to emotional negotiators such as those in Turkey and to evaluate delayed issues as similar to immediate ones. In addition, U.S. negotiators will take less time negotiating than negotiators in Turkey since irrelevant, non-factual matters are not as likely to be brought to the table. In Turkey, delayed issues are likely to lose their importance in the face of immediate ones. Being emotional negotiators, Turks

| Table 2. Negotiating in Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Portugal            | Turkey               | U.S.                 |
| Negotiating as a    | Infrequent smalland-  | Frequent small- and   |
| common vs.          | big-item negotiations| big-item negotiations|
| uncommon activity   |                      | frequent big-item    |
| Negotiating as a    | Process and outcome  | Process (negotiation  |
| process vs. an      | (negotiation as a    | as an enjoyable       |
| outcome             | venue to maintain    | activity)             |
| Negotiating as a    | Rational and emotional| Emotional exchange    |
| rational vs. an     | exchange              | (negotiating through  |
| emotional,          |                       | debating and          |
| argumentative       |                       | argumentation)        |
| process             |                       |                      |


will involuntarily focus on their emotions salient during negotiation and have a heightened focus on what is at stake at the present moment in time, possessing an inconsistent view of time. On the other hand, negotiators in Portugal, who may use emotional and rational approaches in negotiations, are likely to lie somewhere in between U.S. and Turkish negotiators in how much time they take to negotiate and how they perceive delayed issues.

To summarize, although negotiating may be observed in many different national cultures, the negotiation paradigm with which negotiation is carried out can vary substantially. The idiosyncrasies illustrated for Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. (see Table 2) highlight some of the negotiation processes that underlie the characteristics of these countries’ negotiation paradigms. Establishing variations across nations on paradigms utilized during negotiations is valuable because these variations are likely to influence temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiation such as emphasis on immediate vs. temporally distant outcomes or the amount of time spent on finalizing an agreement.

NATIONAL STABILITY, CULTURAL TEMPORALITY, AND NEGOTIATION PARADIGM

In this section, we describe how different elements of national environment (i.e., cultural temporality, negotiation paradigm, and national stability) relate to one another as well as to negotiation processes and outcomes, following Fig. 1. We suggest that individuals’ temporal attitudes and behaviors during negotiations are likely to be heavily influenced by the nation-level negotiation paradigms that stem from both nation-level cultural temporality and stability. To the extent that individuals’ views, attitudes, preferences, and actions are partly a product of their national environment, negotiation processes and outcomes will reflect the characteristics of cultural temporality and stability. Cultural temporality and stability can restrict the available attitudes and behaviors in specific negotiation situations by presenting a frame for how one will approach and think about a negotiation situation. An individual from a culture low on time tangibility (Hall, 1959 i.e., a characteristic of cultural temporality) or a culture of close relationships (i.e., a characteristic of national stability) is likely to place a strong emphasis on the process of negotiating because building and preserving the relationship is an important aspect of these cultures. Therefore, one will observe a
process orientation (i.e., a characteristic of negotiation paradigm) from negotiators.

Negotiation paradigms will then have an overarching influence on how individuals act during negotiations and the agreements they reach. For example, we would expect that negotiators from a culture low on time tangibility or high on close relationships who tend to be process oriented in negotiation situations will be less focused on meeting the deadlines for reaching an agreement than on creating a trusting relationship. In contrast, negotiators from a culture high on time tangibility (i.e., viewing time in blocks, as something that one can partition into smaller units) or low on close-relationships who tend to place more emphasis on the outcome of the negotiation than the process will focus heavily on planning and preparing for negotiations and meeting the negotiation deadline.

It is important to note that at any given time multiple national stability factors, as part of the broader national environment, will influence temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiation. For the purposes of this chapter, we only discuss those stability factors, including institutional systems, close relationships, and population homogeneity, whose effects on temporal behaviors are relatively straightforward. However, other factors such as religion, economic development, the role of the state, or historical heritage also exist. These factors can affect negotiations in a combined fashion. For example, a few of the characteristics of the national environment in the U.S. are a future orientation, a Protestant ethic (including elements of punctuality, diligence, deferment of gratification, and primacy of the work domain, Rose, 1985), and a stable, powerful economy. A stable economy may reinforce an optimistic view of the future and enable future-oriented behaviors such as planning or forecasting.

A future orientation coupled with a strong Protestant ethic create an even stronger economy and stable institutions, adding to the cycle where both temporal culture (e.g. future orientation) and national stability (e.g., institutional system) influence one another. A heavy orientation to the future and a strong Protestant ethic, in turn, can lead individuals to view negotiating as a rational process where individuals do planning before and during negotiating as well as work toward set deadlines and place great value on issues whose outcomes will be realized in the future. A healthy, steady economy may also eliminate the attractiveness of negotiating as a common activity and limits negotiating to big-ticket items. In addition, future orientation and strong Protestant ethic can focus negotiators’ attention on the outcome of negotiating.
Portugal can be characterized by a history of revolutions over the last decades, such as the fall of the dictatorial regime in 1974. The volatile history, resulting in an unstable economy, may reinforce a pessimistic view of the future. In addition, individuals tend to converse about and generally focus on the past and the present more than the future. Because the future is not viewed the same way as the present, and because poor economic conditions persist along with a collectivist culture, the Portuguese are likely to focus on the process of negotiating rather than the outcome to maintain relationships. In turn, deadlines are not heavily emphasized and heavy emphasis is likely to be placed on issues whose outcomes will be realized today in negotiation situations. Turkey’s poor economy in addition to its adherence to the Muslim faith may reinforce a view where the future cannot be controlled, which explains the heavy emphasis on the present. Therefore, the negotiation paradigm in Turkey considers negotiating a common activity, an emotional process, and is process-instead of outcome-oriented. Planning or forecasting is rarely observed because the economy is volatile and future conditions cannot be easily anticipated. Short-term solutions to even complex problems are common. Due to these characteristics of the negotiation paradigm in Turkey, one can observe lack of attention to deadlines as well as focus on issues with immediate outcomes.

DISCUSSION

National environment has a pervasive impact on perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals embedded in that environment. In this chapter, we extend previous work on negotiations by exploring temporality in different national cultures and discussing differences in negotiation processes and outcomes across cultures when negotiations have temporal constraints such as deadlines or delayed implementation of outcomes. Understanding how perceptions of time differ across cultures is an important step in understanding a variety of managerial dimensions. Perceptions of time influence strategic choices (Reger & Huff, 1993), decision-making styles (Beldona, Inkpen, & Pratak, 1998) and negotiation per se (Foster, 1992).

Understanding the influence of time on negotiations is important because temporal concerns are ubiquitous in negotiations. Organizations and individuals often negotiate with a deadline or negotiate for outcomes that are delayed. In fact, not only negotiated outcomes but also other outcomes are often delayed. An investment project may only yield a financial return after many years. The return for years of education manifests itself over the life of
an individual. Procurement relationships that entail deliveries scheduled
over a predefined period may extend to several months. In addition, ne-
gotiation research and practice can benefit from an understanding of con-
ditions under which negotiations are likely to lead to agreements that are
more efficient. Delayed outcomes or deadlines may bring this efficiency to
the extent that the future is discounted in the eyes of the negotiators, the rate
of which can vary from one culture to another, or that deadlines are taken
into consideration when building agreements.

One of the primary contributions of this paper is to introduce the concept
of negotiation paradigm as a mechanism through which national environ-
ment affects temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiations. We suggest
that complex environmental factors give rise to the development of cognitive
paradigms that societies use as a roadmap to approach negotiation situa-
tions. For example, we suggested that while some cultures are more process-
oriented, others are more outcome-oriented in a negotiation context.

Another important contribution of this paper is in suggesting a way to
overcome an implicit view in much research that time means the same for all
individuals in all countries, suggesting that we move away from “parochial”
views of human phenomena (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991). We argue that we
should look at time as a multidimensional construct including, for example,
future orientation, uncertainty avoidance, and time tangibility. We also
suggest that, to understand the impact of time on negotiation, we must
integrate macro environmental factors, such as institutional and economic
influences, and cultural temporality that form negotiation paradigms, which
influence temporality in negotiation. Our analysis emphasizes the perspec-
tive that as the conceptualizations of time differ across cultures so should
the negotiations with temporal elements.

It is important to note that the effect of national environment on nego-
tiating is complex and, therefore, hard to predict. At any given point in time,
several environmental factors such as political, legal, economic, and social
institutions (e.g., governance mechanism, religion, economic development)
come together to create certain types of negotiation paradigms in the minds
of individuals in a given society. These paradigms, in turn, affect temporal
orientations in negotiation, such as how societies negotiate for immediate
and delayed implementation of outcomes behave in the face of a deadline,
and so on. Turkey, Portugal, and the U.S. are characterized by different
combinations of interdependent political, legal, economic, social, and insti-
tutional factors, which influence negotiations. These environmental factors
also change over time, creating further changes in negotiation paradigms,
and, therefore, in temporal preferences and behaviors in negotiations.
We suggest specific directions where theoretical and empirical work might be worthwhile. First, future research may benefit from undertaking a more in-depth analysis of the impact of past and present developments in the economic, legal, political, and social arenas. For instance, the influence of British colonization and the September 11th events on the U.S., the effect of Islam and the formal recognition of Turkey as a candidate to join the European Union on Turkey, or how the Portuguese culture has evolved to accommodate the impact of the European Union, are worth noting as forces shaping temporal views. That is, as the environment changes, so do the cultural and individual interpretations of such aspects as time.

Future research could also develop a thorough examination of different temporal constructs across cultures. This requires overcoming our natural parochialism (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991), which often emerges when researchers use the very same measure across countries without appropriate adaptations. In addition, given the complexity inherent in delayed outcomes, future quasi-experimental research on cross-cultural negotiations can benefit from simple manipulations of time, for example, manipulating a single temporal orientation (e.g., future orientation) rather than manipulating delays.

Another avenue for future research is to identify the similarities and differences among countries in how individuals allocate burdens in negotiation situations. Perhaps the allocation of resources with negative valences (Sondak, Neale, & Pinkley, 1995) is a function of negotiators' prior experiences. For instance, individuals more accustomed to dealing with burdens may be more efficient when negotiating for burdens than individuals that deal more often with benefits. Thus, it would be reasonable to suggest that negotiators in Turkey would reach more efficient negotiated agreements than those in Portugal, who will reach more efficient agreements than those in the U.S.

This should be particularly true when allocating delayed burdens. These relative efficiencies would result naturally from differences in the economic wealth of the country and its citizens. Nonetheless, future research may test specifically whether individuals primed with burdens are more or less efficient than those primed with benefits.

Studying negotiation as a special case of collective decision processes such as group decision making highlights the importance of the social or relationship aspect of negotiation, which is affected by the broader environment, including the culture in which the negotiation takes place. For example, in a nation characterized by close interpersonal ties, negotiation interactions will focus on the process of negotiating, which will involve building and maintaining the relationship between parties. These relation-
ship building efforts are likely to yield a cooperative style of negotiating, making it easier for parties to reach the integrative potential of an agreement. Overall, environmental characteristics whose influences are ingrained within individuals in a given nation are likely to affect the interactions between parties, which can determine negotiation outcomes.

**Implications**

Although our examination is theoretical, it is easy to foresee a number of implications for research and practice related to intra-cultural negotiations. Understanding negotiation paradigms within cultures can help set expectations for how negotiations will take place within those cultures. For example, if negotiating is a common experience in a given culture, then, in many situations, individuals will be expected to negotiate to be able to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Going into the negotiation with a shared mindset that negotiating is to be expected will help parties feel comfortable with the idea and act of negotiating, making it easier for them to be able to reach a mutual agreement.

In addition, understanding the impact of culture on negotiation can help parties adjust their negotiation strategies accordingly. For instance, if, in a given culture, individuals tend to underestimate the importance of the value of future outcomes (i.e., discount the value of future outcomes), they are likely to trade off future outcomes for present ones even though the value of the present outcomes may be less than that of future outcomes. However, a negotiator who is aware of the tendency to underestimate future outcomes can use this information to his or her advantage by trading off present outcomes that are not as valuable for future outcomes that are more valuable. Overall, understanding how individuals go about negotiating within a given culture can set mutual expectations for parties involved in the negotiation and create opportunities to adjust one’s strategy to increase individual gain.

A number of implications for cross-cultural negotiations also exist. First, a past or a present orientation may be associated with greater discounting effects, which is not necessarily bad in a negotiation setting. When negotiated outcomes are delayed into the future, greater discounting may lead to less difficult negotiations and therefore better agreements (Okhuysen et al., 2003). Managers in different cultures need to recognize how differences in temporal perceptions may lead to conflicts over the realization of a negotiated agreement. Negotiators may display more or less heated arguments
and emotions when the outcomes are delayed or immediately realized. Thus, it is important for managers to pay attention to how negotiators' temporal perceptions are likely to differ across cultures, and how these orientations may affect the negotiation processes and outcomes. For example, one could expect negotiating to be a little more competitive when negotiating over delayed issues with a future-oriented negotiator than with a present or past-oriented negotiator. A future-oriented one is likely to put great emphasis on the issues even when their implementation is to occur in a distant future.

It is important to note that when individuals from different cultures negotiate, the process and the outcome of the negotiation will follow the joint decision-making process, which will include elements of conflict and underlying interests. On one hand, differences in negotiation paradigms such as process orientation as observed in Turkey vs outcome orientation as observed in the U.S. are likely to create conflict during negotiating. Similar to differences in attitudes toward quality and punctuality that Foster (1992) noted between Americans and the French, a Turkish negotiator will value the process of negotiating and extend this process to build a relationship, while a U.S. negotiator will focus on the outcome and the deadline to reach this outcome. Conflict is likely to arise as the Turkish negotiator insists on a business lunch or dinner and the U.S. negotiator is anxious to close the deal.

On the other hand, differences in time orientations such as present-orientation of a Turkish negotiator and a future-orientation of a negotiator from the U.S. can help parties realize the integrative potential in an agreement through trading-off among issues with immediate and delayed outcomes that have different levels of importance to each party. In sum, differences in negotiation paradigms and temporal orientations can create conflict while providing opportunities for logrolling or trade-offs.

Notwithstanding, it is important to remember Adler and Graham’s (1989) finding that individuals adjust their behavior when negotiating cross-culturally. In particular, Adler and Graham (1989) found that managers revealed different negotiating behaviors when negotiating intra-culturally than when they engaged in cross-cultural negotiation. This is a positive indication that managers are aware of the cultural differences and adapt accordingly. However, the first step toward appropriate adaptation is the knowledge of what to adapt to such as the local interpretations of time and the environmental factors surrounding those interpretations.
UNCITED REFERENCES


NOTES

1. GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) is a research program that focuses on culture and leadership in 61 countries (House et al., 2002).

2. The Latin Europe cluster comprises Spain, Portugal, Italy, French Switzerland, France, and Israel (Jesuino, 2002). The Arabic cluster includes Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Kuwait, and Qatar (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002). The Anglo cluster consists of Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa (White sample), and the United States of America (Ashkanasy et al., 2002).

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